

Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

INRE-00 /026 W

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FM USDEL SALT TWO II

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1920

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 SALT TWO II 0140/1

EXDIS/ SALT

E. O. 11652 XGDSI

TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: SALT: HIGHLIGHTS OF APRIL 3 POST- MEETING DISCUSSIONS

REF: USDEL SALT TWO II 136

DOD HANDLE AS SPECAT FOR SECDEF

SUMMARY. THERE FOLLOWS A DETAILED ACCOUNT OF THE APRIL 3
POST- MEETING DISCUSSIONS. END SUMMARY.

1. AGGREGATE LEVELS: GRINEVSKY MADE SPECIAL POINT OF
DRAWING GRAYBEAL ASIDE (A-195) TO ASK IF LATTER HAD
DETECTED " NEW POINTS IN THEIR STATEMENT." WHEN GRAYBEAL
SAID HE FOUND SOVIET LIST OF " PROBLEMS TO BE SOLVED" A
USEFUL SUMMARY, GRINEVSKY SAID IT IMPORTANT THAT US SIDE
CAREFULLY STUDY SOVIET STATEMENT FOR " NUANCES." STATEMENT
REPRESENTED AN IMPORTANT MOVE ON PART OF THE SOVIET SIDE.
GRINEVSKY CALLED ATTENTION TO ITEM INDICATING THAT SOVIET
SIDE WAS READY TO DISCUSS " LEVELS OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE
WEAPONS." WHEN ASKED IF THIS MEANT SOVDEL READY TO
DISCUSS EQUAL AGGREGATE LEVEL OF CENTRRAL STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE
WEAPONS, GRINEVSKY REPLIED THAT OTHER SYSTEMS MUST ALSO BE
INCLUDED IN A DISCUSSION OF LEVELS, SPECIFICALLY REFERRING TO
SOVIET FBS PROPOSAL. IT WAS CLEAR GRINEVSKY CONSIDERED SOVIET
WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS " LEVELS OF STRATEGIC WEAPONS" A
SIGNIFICANT MOVE, AND WANTED TO BE SURE GRAYBEAL AWARE

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OF THIS " NEW" SOVIET POSITION.

2. GRINEVSKY SAID US PROPOSALS WERE BEING GIVEN " VERY SERIOUS CONSIDERATION" IN MOWCOW, AND THAT IT WOULD BE MOST HELPFUL IF US COULD PROVIDE ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION TOTAL OF GROSS SALARY CONSIDERED FOR PENSION PURPOSES IS INCREASED BY FIXED PERCENTAGE (HALL THOUGHT FIVE PER CENT). SECRETARIAT STAFF MEMBER PRESENT STATED THAT SUCH ADJUSTMENT MADE ONCE RECENTLY. DURING SUMMER 1972, AND HAD COST IAEA APPROXIMATELY \$92,000 IN INCREASED AGENCY PENSION CONTRIBUTIONS. HOWEVER, THIS ADJUSTMENT WAS MADE AT THAT TIME ON INSTRUCTION FROM NEW YORK, AND ALTHOUGH SECRETARIAT NOW LOOKING FOR SPECIFIC REGULATION CITATIONS GOVERNING THIS PROCEDURE, THEY HAVE NOT YET BEEN ABLE LOCATE SAME.

4. PROPOSAL HAS BEEN MADE BY UN SYG WALDHEIM TO ALTER THIS COMPUTATION BY FOLDING SUCH INCREASES INTO NET SALARIES. THIS WOULD RATIONALIZE STRUCTURE BY MINIMIZING CONCEALED POST ADJUSTMENT COMPONENT VIS-A-VIS ACTUAL EMPLOYEE SALARIES IN COMPUTATIONS FOR PENSION CONTRIBUTIONS. IT WOULD ALSO HAVE EFFECT OF BRINGING ISSUE FORMALLY BEFORE 5 TH COMMITTEE AT NEXT UNGA.

5. HALL STATED THAT BASED UPON HIS UNDERSTANDING OF UN PROPOSAL, IAEA INCLINED TO SUPPORT SYG' S IDEA, HOWEVER, DURING MEETING OF PERSONNEL SECTION OF CCAQ HELD RECENTLY IN PARIS, IT EMERGED THAT UN AND IAEA LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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ALONE IN SUPPORTING UN PROPOSAL, OPPOSED BY ALL OTHER SA REPS LED BY LARGE GENEVA- BASED AGENCIES. GROUNDS FOR SA OBJECTION SEEMED TO HALL TO BE PRIMARILY THAT THIS COMPUTATION AS RESPECTS PENSIONS NOW AUTOMATICALLY PERFORMED BY AGENCY SECRETARIATS WITHOUT FORMAL ACTION, WHILE TO ADOPT UN IDEA WOULD BRING ISSUE FORMALLY TO FIFTH COMMITTEE (WHERE OTHER AGENCIES REPORTEDLY QUITE WORRIED ABOUT US AND OTHER MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS' REACTIONS) AT TIME WHEN ALL OTHER AGENCIES IN UN SYSTEM UNDER SEVERE FINANCIAL PRESSURE WHICH THEY BLAMED IN PART ON OUT LOOK WITH RESPECT US PAYMENT OF ASSESSED CONTRIBUTIONS.

6. ACCORDING TO HALL, THIS HAS EMERGED AS MAIN ISSUE IN DISCUSSIONS AT ACC PREPCOM, WITH UN AND IAEA AGAIN ALONG AGAINST REST OF SYSTEM. HALL WAS FURTHER BEMUSED BY RECENT RECEIPT OF CABLE TO CHAIRMAN OF IAEA STAFF COUNCIL FROM RATHORE, CHAIRMAN OF FICSA, ASKING THAT FICSA APPRECIATION FOR IAEA STAND BE EXPRESSED TO DG. FYI: SINCE SALARY REVIEW COMMITTEE SITUATION, HALL IS PERSONALLY INCLINED TO BE SUSPICIOUS OF ALMOST ANYTHING FAVORED BY FICSA, AND HE IS WORRIED ABOUT POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS OF ANY IDEA WHERE IAEA SUPPORT OF PROPOSAL WINS IT STATEMENT OF PRAISE FROM THEM. END FYI.

7. HALL WAS FRANK TO ADMIT THAT HE DID NOT FULLY UNDERSTAND COMPLEXITIES OF SITUATION, AND THAT THIS MIGHT HAVE LED HIM ASTRAY IN POSITION ON ISSUE. HE ASKED WHAT INFORMATION MISSION HAD AS TO US POSITION. AS THIS PROBABLY MISLEADING REPORT OF HIS STATEMENTS ILLUSTRATES, MISSION AFRAID IT UNDERSTANDS ISSUE AT PRESENT NO BETTER THAN HALL.

8. REQUEST ANY BACKGROUND DEPT. OR ANY OTHER IO MISSION MAY HAVE ON THIS QUESTION, INCLUDING IF POSSIBLE CITATION OF REGULATION UNDER WHICH THIS COMPUTATION OF POST ADJUSTMENT ADDITION TO GROSS SALARY FOR PENSION PURPOSES PERFORMED. ALSO, REQUEST DEPT. GUIDANCE AS TO HOW MISSION MIGHT RESPOND TO HALL, AND WHETHER DEPT. FEELS IT IS IN US INTEREST TO USE THIS CHANNEL INTO ACC DISCUSSION LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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OF THIS QUESTION OR REMAIN SILENT AND ADVISE IAEA TO DO LIKEWISE.
EXEMPT FROM AUTOMATIC DECONTROL BY AMB. DWIGHT J. PORTER
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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

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FM USDEL SALT TWO II

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1921

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 SALT TWO II 0140/2

EXDIS/ SALT

7. " OTHER" SYSTEMS: WHEN FITZGERALD ASKED PLESHAKOV (A-198) WHAT HE THOUGHT MIGHT CONTRIBUTE TO " PROGRESS," LATTER REPLIED SIDES SHOULD REACH AGREEMENT ON BOMBERS, FBS, AND OTHER SYSTEMS. IN REPLY TO A QUESTION, HE SAID " OTHER SYSTEMS" DID NOT MEAN " NON- CENTRAL" SYSTEMS BUT SUCH SYSTEMS AS INTERCONTINENTAL SLCMS, ALBMS, SEABEDS, ETC.

8. NON- CENTRAL SYSTEMS: TRUSOV (TO ROWNY, A-196) CLAIMED THAT IN THE AGGREGATE OF US FORCES WHICH CAN BE CONSIDERED STRATEGIC, NON- CENTRAL SYSTEMS MAKE UP " ABOUT 40 PERCENT" OF TOTAL, AND THEY CAN EXPAND INDEFINITELY. ROWNY REPLIED ANY OBJECTIVE COMPARISON OF NON- CENTRAL SYSTEMS WOULD SHOW AN IMBALANCE FAVORING THE SOVIET SIDE.

9. PLESHAKOV (TO FITZGERALD, A-198), AMPLIFYING HIS EARLIER REMARK THAT SOVIET SIDE COULD NOT ACCEPT US " PROMISE" TO DISCUSS FBS IN FUTURE (A-190), SAID IT POSSIBLE THT PROBLEM COULD BE DISCUSSED " IN PARALLED" WHILE AGREEMENT WAS BEING REACHED ON BOMBERS AND " OTHER SYSTEMS" (SEE PARA 7).

10. INTERIM/ PERMANENT AGREEMENT: KLOSSON ASKED CHULITSKY (A-199) TO CLARIFY WHAT SOVIETS HAD IN MIND IN SEVENOV' SMARCH 20 STATEMENT THAT THE IA HAD " RESOLVED" CERTAIN QUESTIONS PERTAINING TO ICBMS AND SLBMS. CHULITSKY REPLIED THAT FIGURES IN IA WOULD HOLD FOR ITS DURATION. RECALLING THAT USDEL HAD REPEATEDLY EMPHASIZED THAT THE NUMBERS WHICH MIGHT HAVE BEEN ACCEPTABLE FOR AN IA WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTABLE FOR A
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PAGE 02 SALT T 00140 02 ION AT AN EARLY DATE.

WHEN GRAYBEAL NOTED THAT US STILL WAITING FOR SOVIET SIDE TO ENGAGE IN A MEANINGFUL DISCUSSION OF ESSENTIAL EQUIVALENCE AND STRESSED THAT NUMERICAL ASYMMETRIES CONTAINED IN IA NOT ACCEPTABLE IN A PERMANENT AGREEMENT, GRINEVSKY IMMEDIATELY REFERRED BACK TO SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS " LEVELS OF STRATEGIC WEAPONS." HE SAID THIS DISCUSSION MUST INCLUDE " OTHER STRATEGIC SYSTEMS," AND US VIEWS ON HOW NON- CENTRAL

SYSTEMS WOULD BE " TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT" WOULD BE MOST HELPFUL IN MAKING PROGRESS. GRINEVSKY STRONGLY URGED DISCUSSION OF BOTH CENTRAL STRATEGIC SYSTEMS AND NON- CENTRAL STRATEGIC SYSTEMS IN PARALLEL AS BEST WAY TO MAKE PROGRESS.

3. SHCHUKIN (TO NITZE, A-197) SAID THAT HE HAD GREAT DIFFICULTY UNDERSTANDING HOW BOTH SIDES COULD HAVE EQUAL AGGREGATE NUMBERS OF ICBMS, SLBMS AND HEAVY BOMERS, AND AT THE SAME TIME, EQUAL NUMBERS OF ICBM LAUNCHERS AND EQUAL THROW- WEIGHT NITZE SAID US PROPOSAL INVOLVED CEILINGS; THE ACTUAL NUMBERS POSSESSED BY THE SIDES DID NOT HAVE TO EQUAL ANY OR ALL OF THE CEILINGS. SCCHUKIN SAID THIS WAS DIFFICULT FOR HIM TO UNDER- STAND. AS HE SAW IT, EITHER THE US WOULD HAVE TO AUGMENT ITS FORCES, WHICH WAS CONTRARY TO THE POINT OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS, OR ELSE THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD HAVE TO REDUCE ITS FORCES, PARTICULARLY ITS ICBM FORCES. NITZE SAID IT WAS POSSIBLE TO CONCEIVE OF AN AGREEMENT WHICH PROVIDED FOR PHASED REDUCTIONS TO MEET THE CEILING OVER A PERIOD OF TIME.

4. SCCHUKIN SAID ANOTHER POINT OF DIFFICULTY HE HAD WITH THE US PROPOSAL FOR EQUAL AGGREGATE, ICBM AND THROW- WEIGHT CEILINGS WAS THAT HE COULD SEE NO DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE US HAVING RIGHT TO BUILD UP TO THE CEILING AND THE US ACTUALLY DOING SO. HE SAID HE THOUGHT WE SHOULD BEGIN WITH WHERE WE ARE NOW AND LIMIT INCREASES FROM PRESENT LEVELS. NITZE SAID THAT AT ONE TIME WASHINGTON HAD GIVEN SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO A " STOP WHERE WE ARE" CONCEPT. IF ONE APPLIED THIS CONCEPT TO THE CURRENT SITUATION, THE US WOULD CONTINUE TO HAVE MIRVS AND SOVIET SIDE WOULD HAVE NONE. SCHCHUKIN SAID THIS WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTABLE. NITZE SAID THAT IF THE SOVIET SIDE WERE TO INSIST ON EQUALITY

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WITH RESPECT TO MIRV LIMITATIONS, THEN LOGIC REQUIRED EQUALITY IN THE CEILINGS ON THE OTHER SIGNIFICANT PARAMETERS.

5. FITZGERALD (TO PLESHAKOV, A-198) NOTED THAT SOVIET SIDE HAD REPEATED JUST ABOUT EVERY PROPOSAL MADE DURING GENEVA- I EXCEPT FOR EQUAL BOMBER LEVELS. PLESHAKOV SAID THEIR PROPOSAL IS FOR " AGREED LEVELS. " FITZGERALD NOTED THAT PLESHAKOV HAD BEEN THE FIRST ONE ON SOVDEL TO STATE IN DECEMBER THAT LEVELS SHOULD BE EQUAL. DID HIS REFERENCE TO " AGREED LEVELS" MEAN THAT SOVIET SIDE IS PROPOSING UNEQUAL BOMBER LEVELS? HE WOULD NOT GIVE DIRECT ANSWER AND SAID SOVIET SIDE IS NOW " SAYING WHAT IT IS PROPOSING."

6. BOMBERS AND BOMBER ARMAMENTS: SCHCHUKIN (TO NITZE, A-197) SAID HE THOUGHT THAT IN ORDER TO GET ON WITH THE NEGOTIATIONS, US SIDE SHOULD DISCUSS BOMBERS AND BOMBER ARMAMENTS. HE SAID

HE THOUGHT BOMBERS WERE, IN CERTAIN WAYS, MORE COMPARABLE TO
SUBMARINES THAN THEY WERE TO MISSILE LAUNCHERS. ONE BOMBER
COULD LAUNCH MORE THAN ONE AIR- TO- SURFACE MISSILE. NITZE SAID
THAT ONE ICBM MISSILE COULD, IF MIRVED, LAUNCH MORE THAN ONE
REENTRY VEHICLE. SHCHUKIN NOTED THAT AMBASSADOR JOHNSON HAD
TODAY REFERRED
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